

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEA-10 PM-04 NSC-05  
SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07  
NSAE-00 IGA-02 EB-07 DODE-00 EA-07 /100 W  
-----261800Z 058253 /42

P R 261628Z MAY 77  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4411  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 08776

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XJ, SU, LY, UR, US  
SUBJECT: YOUNG AND SUDANESE FONMIN KHALID DISCUSS  
LIBYA AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFRICA

1. AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND HIS STAFF MET FOR AN HOUR  
MAY 24 IN KHARTOUM WITH SUDANESE FONMIN KHALID AND  
MINSTATE DENG PRIOR TO THE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT

NIMEIRI (SEPTTEL). AFTER A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF  
SUDAN'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL FOR CONTRI-  
BUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY, KHALID RAISED SUDAN'S  
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TROUBLES WITH LIBYA AS AN EXAMPLE OF TENSIONS ENGENDERED  
BY THE SOLID STRENGTH DEVELOPING WITHIN THE SUDAN.  
SUDAN'S FOCUS INTERNALLY SINCE NIMEIRI CAME TO POWER HAS  
UNIFIED THE COUNTRY AND LAUNCHED THE DEVELOPMENT  
STRATEGY. NOW SUDAN CAN AFFORD TO LOOK TO EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS.

2. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS QUADDAFY WHO MUST BE MENTALLY DISTURBED WITH A SPLIT PERSONALITY. YOUNG AND KHALID AGREED THAT QUADDAFY'S NOTION OF PAN-AFRICANISM IS UNLIKE NKRUMAH'S; IT SPRINGS FROM A DESIRE FOR CONQUEST. QUADDAFY'S DRIVE IS ALSO FUELED IDEOLOGICALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID, HOWEVER, HE HOPED WE COULD AVOID MAKING THE MISTAKE WE ALL MADE WITH AMIN. NO ONE PAID ANY ATTENTION TO HIM UNTIL HE SLIPPED BEYOND THE INFLUENCE OF OTHERS. THIS WAS TRAGIC ENOUGH IN UGANDA. IN LIBYA, THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS SINCE LIBYA WITH ITS MONEY AND FANATICISM COULD SPREAD TERROR THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

3. KHALID SAID QUADDAFY HAS ONLY A SMALL CIRCLE OF SUPPORTERS IN LIBYA, A BASE SO NARROW THAT HE SHOULD NOT THINK HE CAN BE EMPEROR OF AFRICA OR THE ME. HE PERSONALLY IS AN UNPREDICTABLE NONENTITY.

4. IN RESPONSE TO YOUNG'S DISCUSSION OF THE BROAD US STRATEGY IN AFRICA, KHALID AND DENG NOTED THE POSITIVE RECEPTION THAT POLICY HAS RECEIVED AMONG AFRICANS. THEY OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US HAS APPEARED VERY CAUTIOUS IN ITS NEW APPROACH TO AFRICA, PROBABLY BECAUSE THE AMERICANS ARE STILL NOT CERTAIN OF THEIR RECEPTION. THIS CAUTION POSES PROBLEMS FOR SOME AFRICANS: THE SOMALIS TELL KHALID THEY HAVE GOTTEN NOTHING BUT CAUTION FROM THE US IN RESPONSE TO SOMALI PROBES FOR SUPPORT-- THEREFORE THE SUDAN SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN BANKING ON THE AMERICANS.

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5. YOUNG SAID THE US HAS STRAIGHTFORWARD MONEY PROBLEMS IN MEETING ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AROUND THE WORLD, WHICH IS ONE BASIC EXPLANATION FOR OUR CAUTION. IN SOMALIA, HE HOPED THAT WHATEVER HAPPENED, THE US WOULD NOT MAKE THE SOVIETS THINK WE WERE TRYING TO DRIVE THEM OUT OF AFRICA. HE COMMENTED THAT IN THE ME, WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN GIVEN A ROLE IN GENEVA, THEY HAVE BECOME LESS OF A DISRUPTIVE FORCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD NOT DEVISE A TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT UNDERSTANDING IN AFRICA. IT MIGHT BE THOUGHT OF AS A VARIANT OF THE VARIOUS REGIONAL ZONE-OF-PEACE CONCEPTS. WITH THIS KIND OF UNDERSTANDING, FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD PROVIDE AID TO SOMALIA WITHOUT PUSHING OUT THE SOVIETS. WE MIGHT CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY ON EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, LEAVING A PRIMARY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVE ROLE FOR THE SOVIETS IN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. UNDER THIS KIND OF NON-ALIGNMENT NOTION, THE TRADITIONAL TENSIONS OF COMPETITION WOULD BE ALTERED, THE DILEMMAS EASED FOR AFRICAN STATES, AND SUPERPOWER INTERFERENCE IN

THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL STATES HALTED.  
THE US COULD FEEL WELCOME IN SUCH RADICAL AREAS AS  
ANGOLA AND SOMALIA, WHERE OUR TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL  
EFFICIENCY WOULD COMPETE WELL ON THEIR OWN MERITS. THE  
BASIC QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE

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SOVIETS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUCH A NON-  
ALIGNMENT ENVIRONMENT. YOUNG SAID HE WANTED TO DISCUSS  
THISCONCEPT FURTHER WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON.

6. KHALID SAID HE FEELS THE AFRICANS SHOULD NEVER TRY  
TO EXPEL THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE IN MOST NATIONAL SITUATIONS  
THE SOVIETS ARE NEEDED FOR BALANCE AGAINST WESTERN  
PRESENCE. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE  
SOVIETS WOULD EVER BE WILLING TO PLAY A "CONSTRUCTIVE"  
ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNMENT UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED BY  
AMBASSADOR YOUNG. THEY ALWAYS DRIVE TOWARD INFLUENCE,

THEN CONTROL OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, INSISTING THAT  
DEVELOPMENT MUST END UP ON THEIR MODEL. AFRICANS, IN  
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ANY EVENT, HAVE NO QUARREL WITH SOMALIA, ANGOLA,  
MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHERS, IF THEY WISH TO USE MARXIST  
MODELS.

7. DENG SAID YOUNG WAS RIGHT: THE BIG PROBLEM IS A  
COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. HE SAID  
THEY HAVE AN IDEOLOGICAL INTOLERANCE THAT WILL BAR  
COOPERATION UNTIL THE POWER STRUGGLE IN A COUNTRY GOES  
COMPLETELY THEIR WAY. YOUNG COMMENTED THAT SOVIET  
INTOLERANCE IS MORE RACIAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL, A POINT  
ACKNOWLEDGED BY KHALID AND DENG. YOUNG SAID THE SOVIETS  
ARE ONLY COMFORTABLE WHEN THEY CAN ISSUE ORDERS TO  
AFRICANS. THEY ARE INSTINCTIVELY INTOLERANT OF INDE-  
PENDENT THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS BY A STRONG, MODERN AFRICAN  
LEADER.

8. KHALID CONTRASTED THE SOVIETS' RIGIDITY WITH THE  
STYLE OF THE CHINESE. THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD  
DIFFICULTY IN GETTING TECHNICIANS AND AID SPECIALISTS  
TO GO TO THE SOUTH TO HELP IN DEVELOPMENT, BUT THE  
CHINESE CAME IN AND IMMEDIATELY TOOK ASSIGNMENTS IN THE  
FIELD THERE. CHINESE AID PEOPLE LIVE AMONG THE SUDANESE  
PEOPLE WITH NO SPECIAL FACILITIES OR PRIVILEGES AND  
THEREFORE WITH NO PROBLEMS AT ALL. THERE NOW ARE OVER  
100 CHINESE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.

9. DENG ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW AGGRESSIVE THE SOVIETS  
HAVE PROVEN TO BE IN ATTEMPTING TO MODIFY NATIONAL  
SYSTEMS IN AFRICA. YOUNG RECALLED SOVIET FAILURES IN  
THE ME AND SAID HE EXPECTED THEIR BIGGEST FLOP TO COME  
IN ETHIOPIA. AFTER A WHIPPING IN ETHIOPIA, THE SOVIETS  
MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT A NON-ALIGNMENT  
NOTION IN AFRICA. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THE  
SUPERPOWERS SHOULD RUN THE WORLD COOPERATIVELY, AND AS  
LONG AS WE HAVE ACCORDED THEM RESPECT AND HAVE SEEMED TO  
BE WORKING OFF THAT KIND OF PREMISE, THE SOVIETS HAVE  
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APPEARED TO BEHAVE CONSTRUCTIVELY. THEY DO NOT CHANGE  
THEIR LONG-RANGE GOALS, HOWEVER.

10. YOUNG OBSERVED THAT THE FAMILIAR SOVIET APPROACH

HAS BEEN GUIDED BY AN AGING LEADERSHIP THAT IS BOUND TO CHANGE. WITH YOUNGER, MORE MODERN MEN IN CONTROL IN MOSCOW, PERHAPS SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA WILL CHANGE. KHALID REMARKED ONLY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT SEEMED TO LEARN ANY LESSONS FROM THEIR BAD EXPERIENCE WITH GUINEA AND SEKOU TOURE. HE AGREED, THOUGH, THAT STRONG AND INDEPENDENT AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE SOVIET APPROACH COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MOSCOW'S POLICY PERCEPTIONS. YOUNG ADDED THAT IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT THE OAU MEETING IN GABON IN LATE JUNE 1977 WOULD FURTHER DEFINE TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THAT SUCH A REDEFINITION WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN APPROACHING A CONCEPT OF A ZONE-OF-PEACE.

11. COMMENT: KHALID AND DENG ARE REMARKABLE LEADERS. THE RANGE OF CONVERSATION OVER SEVERAL EXTENDED OCCASIONS DURING OUR 36 HOURS IN KHARTOUM REVEALED THEIR EXTRAORDINARILY COSMOPOLITAN PREPARATION FOR THE DIFFICULT TASKS BEFORE THEM--THE BEST OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH EDUCATION, SUBSTANTIAL BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND YEARS OF DEALING AT SENIOR-MOST LEVELS WITH CRISES, NATIONAL PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. DENG IS A GRADUATE OF OXFORD AND COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND HAS A DOCTORATE OF LAW FROM YALE. KHALID'S TRAINING WAS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. BOTH OF THESE MEN, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, E.G., THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING HAS A PHD FROM CHICAGO, IN THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT, ARE IMPRESSIVE EXAMPLES OF THE BEST IN LEADERSHIP THAT AFRICA IS PRODUCING. IN THE SUDAN THE 1960'S POLICY OF EDUCATING AFRICANS IN US UNIVERSITIES HAS PAID HANDSOME DIVIDENDS. SPIERS

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## Message Attributes

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